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Man inside metaphors
It has been 10 years since Józef 
Tischner’s death and during that 
time a lot has been said about his 
concept of man. His philosophising 
about human issues is ordered, and 
it seems that all the crucial moments 
in his thought have been identified. 
Attempts in this regard have been 
made by Barbara Skarga, Adam 
Węgrzecki, Karol Tarnowski, Tadeusz Gadacz, Aleksander Bobko, Adam 
Workowski and many others. There is no point in restating their theses or 
following the same paths. However, to begin with, it is worth mentioning 
the pivotal points in order to see what else in Józef Tischner’s philosophy 
remains to be elucidated.
Józef Tischner consistently made a point of using the term 
“philosophy of man” instead of “philosophical anthropology,” which 
was common practice in the phenomenological tradition, in which 
he was grounded. This consistency was to be seen in the name of the 
department1 he headed at the Pontifical Academy of Theology, the name 
of the subject he lectured on2 and the titles of textbooks he prepared for 
his students.3 What are the differences between philosophy of man and 
 1 See The Faculty of Philosophy at the Pontifical Academy of Theology (a presentation), ed. 
T. Gadacz, A. Michalik, W. Skoczny, “Logos i Ethos”, 1991, no.1, p. 167.
 2 See ibidem, p. 165.
 3 See J. Tischner, Wybrane problemy filozofii człowieka, Kraków 1985; idem, Filozofia człowie-
ka dla duszpasterzy i artystów, [in:] idem, Myślenie w żywiole piękna, Kraków 2004, pp. 139–336.
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anthropology? Tischner was aware of the way phenomenology perceives 
the tasks of anthropology. His works do not show he was interested 
in the question of man’s place in the cosmos, and particularly in the 
inquiry into the essence of man, which would be about looking for a set 
of properties that distinguish man from the world of animals. This does 
not, however, mean that Tischner was completely unfamiliar with the 
problem of the human essence of man, as encapsulated in the classical 
question: “who is man?” It was arguably on account of these differences 
that Tischner used the term “philosophy of man,” carefully regarding 
man faced with manifold domains of reality. In a sense one might say 
that the centre of this philosophy is constituted by “man in the world.” 
It is man as confronted with values, with another man, and last but 
not least - with God. These three issues provided an organisational 
framework for Tischner’s reflection. One might advance a hypothesis 
– even though testing it would require a separate study - whereby in his 
philosophy of man Józef Tischner held a relational position: his way of 
understanding man was to elucidate manifold relationships that man 
enters into. These relationships are extremely crucial for capturing that 
which he is. At the same time, for Tischner himself they are an attempt at 
going beyond the substantialist concept of man, of which he was many 
a time critical.4
Those who study Tischner’s thought readily periodise his philosophy.5 
Customarily, a distinction is drawn between three periods6 differentiated 
by both the circle of thought inspiration and methods. These differences 
are clearly significant for the understanding of man and his world.
The first period is one of strong phenomenological inspiration arising 
from the tradition of Roman Ingarden’s thinking. This can be seen in the 
subject matters addressed: subjectivity, values, axiology, an attempt at 
 4 See idem, Filozofia człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów, op. cit., p. 163n; idem, Wybrane 
problemy filozofii człowieka, op. cit., p. 8n; Człowiek przez okna systemu, [in:] idem, Myślenie według 
wartości, Kraków 1993, p. 353n.
 5 See A. Bobko, Poszukiwanie prawdy o człowieku, “Znak”, 2001, no. 3 (550), pp. 56–70.
 6 See idem, Wstęp. Józefa Tischnera myślenie o człowieku, [in:] J. Tischner, O człowieku. Wybór 
pism filozoficznych, Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków 2003, p. XVIIn.
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building the concept of axiological “I,” but it is also visible in the linguistic 
form. The technical language filled with phenomenological jargon is a far 
cry from Tischner’s idiom of the 1980s or 1990s. The texts written in 
that period are collected in the book entitled Świat ludzkiej nadziei,7 and 
in part also in Myślenie według wartości.8 This type of thinking can be 
most clearly seen in his habilitation dissertation entitled Fenomenologia 
świadomości egotycznej.9
In the second period Tischner visibly turns to philosophy of dialogue. 
It is then that he becomes markedly inspired by the thought of Emmanuel 
Lévinas and Franz Rosenzweig. The key concepts for Tischner are now 
the ones of an encounter, the fellow human being, the Face. This period 
bears such fruit as Filozofia dramatu,10 where changed is not only his way 
of speaking about man, but language itself. Tischner shows a variety of 
human dramas, and as he uses a new framework of concepts/metaphors 
he tries to describe a human being in his relationships with others.
Begun with Spór o istnienie człowieka,11 the third period of his 
thinking about man shows ever-growing influence of religious thinking. 
Józef Tischner introduces into the language of his philosophy of man 
the concepts borrowed straight from theology: grace, salvation. Good 
becomes the central category, and the former axiological horizon – 
known from the first period - becomes replaced with an agathological 
horizon. This period is perhaps the most mysterious one. Back then the 
author of Spór o istnienie człowieka addressed themes that he was not 
able to pursue to their conclusion because of his disease and premature 
death. Therefore, there is merely a visible outline of the profound change 
in thinking, including thinking about man. The vistas that are opened up 
by this turn are hardly adumbrated.
 7 See J. Tischner, Świat ludzkiej nadziei, Kraków 1975.
 8 See idem, Myślenie według wartości, op. cit.
 9 See idem, Fenomenologia świadomości egotycznej, [in:] idem, Studia z filozofii świadomości, 
Kraków 2006, pp. 131–418.
 10 See idem, Filozofia dramatu. Wprowadzenie, Kraków 1998.
 11 See idem, Spór o istnienie człowieka, Kraków 1998.
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It is debatable whether these three periods are separated by 
revolutions in Tischner’s thinking, or whether the transitions from one 
to the other are smooth. Undoubtedly, each one of these changes puts 
a slightly different perspective on thinking about man. But there is one 
other thing worth noting. Apart from the substantive kind of evolution, 
there is another one, more often than not regarded less seriously. When 
comparing earlier works – ones written by more or less 1978 – with the 
later ones, one can see a distinct change in style. Tischner’s early works 
were full of precise phenomenological language, the culmination of this 
period being his habilitation dissertation. Later on, this quite rigorous 
language grows slack and Tischner often makes use of metaphors and 
symbols; it is also at that time that some key concepts – so essential 
for Tischner’s late philosophy – appear in his texts, e.g. Face, drama, 
encounter, promise. They are stylistically distant from phenomenological 
phraseology.
Among Tischner’s students this change is most often commented on 
in the following simple manner: Tischner’s command of language was 
better and better; Tischner needed more casual terms to describe the 
experiences he was dealing with – the experiences from the borderline 
between philosophy, pastoral work and commentary journalism; 
Tischner felt suffocated in the straitjacket of phenomenological jargon. 
All these explanations assign the new language a not really vital function, 
though it is not that accidental.12
It is all just about changes in style, or maybe the metaphoricity of the 
language is supposed to refer to a more serious problem?
Around the year 1980 Tischner publishes three texts which can be 
viewed as a peculiar philosophical manifesto. As a man in his 50s, who 
has already written his academic degree dissertations, he tries to ask 
himself a question about what was and what would be the reflection 
that he was pursuing. And so, in the introduction to Myślenie według 
 12 Such opinions quite often appear in talks and casual conversations, so it is difficult to point 
to specific research papers that address the issue. I cite this position in order to point out some at-
mosphere that is being created around Józef Tischner’s thinking.
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wartości he tries to problematise his of own philosophising, trying to 
avoid identification with any “-ism.” These three texts – included in 
the aforementioned collection – are the eponymous Myślenie według 
wartości13 [Thinking in Values], Myślenie religijne14 [Religious Thinking] 
and a paper most interesting from the perspective of this short study: 
Myślenie z wnętrza metafory15 [Thinking from within the Metaphor]. 
These three Thinkings are attempts at describing Tischner’s philosophical 
self-understanding back in that period.
The text of Thinking from within the Metaphor is an attempt at 
answering the question about the place of the metaphor in philosophical 
thinking. There appear several interesting tropes that will later on be 
continued in Tischner’s later texts. They show that the peculiar method 
of his philosophising is not an embellishing afterthought, but it results 
from his metaphysical convictions. Since much has been written about 
Józef Tischner’s philosophy of man, it is no use restating familiar theses. 
Therefore, instead of asking about the WHAT of that reflection on man, 
it is worth asking a question about the HOW.
How does Tischner think about man, what words and structures 
does he couch his reflections in? What might be the meaning of these 
ambiguous metaphors which enchant some with their beauty, while 
annoying others with their vagueness? This short study will address one 
problem: how Tischner thinks about man.
1. The inside of metaphors
As we take a closer look at metaphoricity at the level of linguistic 
expression, literality seems to be the natural opposite of this manner of 
describing the world. Thus, a metaphor is juxtaposed with a concept. 
A concept is accurate, unambiguous, characterised by a high degree of 
 13 See J. Tischner, Myślenie według wartości, [in:] idem, Myślenie według wartości, op. cit., 
pp. 506–523.
 14 See idem, Myślenie religijne, [in:] idem, Myślenie według wartości, op. cit., pp. 357–382.
 15 See idem, Myślenie z wnętrza metafory, [in:] idem, Myślenie według wartości, op. cit., 
pp. 490–505.
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lucidity, while a metaphor is ambiguous, vague. According to Tischner 
this juxtaposition corresponds to some deeper tension of a metaphysical 
character.16
At this level, metaphoricity is juxtaposed with factuality. Factuality – 
and hence the structure of the world presupposed in a natural attitude or 
in commonsensical intuition – can be phrased with a simple expression: 
things are what they appear to be, the world is what we experience it 
to be. The world is a set of facts, and in this sense it is ultimate reality. 
It is self-explanatory and does not require any external, “unworldly” 
explanations.
The change in the attitude to reality takes a radical turn when a man 
tells himself that things might not be what they seem to be. The most 
outstanding example of such problematisation appears in Plato’s parable 
about the cave: the world is but a shadow of the world, and things 
are shadows of true reality.17 Thus, it is only the sense of some non-
obviousness and its attendant sense of non-ultimateness found in the 
factuality of worldliness that triggers metaphorisation. Metaphorisation 
is an attempt at proper description of that mysteriousness encountered 
in the world. If question marks are put over factuality, then the concept 
too – along with its clarity and lucidity – is called into question. If that 
which we see is merely some kind of guise, some reflection and not reality 
itself, then description necessitates other means. And this is where the 
metaphor appears. Metaphoricity at the linguistic level merely reflects 
some metaphoricity of the world at the metaphysical level. While it is 
easy to show the structure of a metaphor at the linguistic level and its 
relation to the concept (literal meaning), showing metaphoricity at the 
metaphysical level is somewhat troublesome.
Let us consider that with the aid of some example. As Paul Ricœur 
analyses the symbolism of evil, he considers the following pattern.18 
 16 See idem, p. 504n.
 17 See Platon, Państwo, trans. W. Witwicki, Warszawa 1994, vol. 2, p. 57n. and: M. Heidegger, 
Platona nauka o prawdzie, trans. S. Blandzi, [in:] idem, Znaki drogi, Warszawa 1999, pp. 179–189.
 18 See P. Ricoeur, Symbolika zła, trans. S. Cichowicz, M. Ochab, Warszawa 1986, p. 17n.
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We have a literal meaning of “stain,” which is related to some physical 
state. The word “stain” is then taken over from the everyday order; it 
denotes a certain uncomplicated actual state. This literal meaning is 
transferred into another field: a stain comes to designate guilt, sin; guilt 
is in a way a stain. This secondary meaning is not literal, but at the same 
time the primary one is not completely obliterated. As the Psalmist 
supplicates God: “wash away all my iniquity and cleanse me from my 
sin!,”19 he plays on these two meanings. That is one aspect of this process 
of metaphorisation: transferring the literal meaning onto the symbolic 
plane. The superimposition of the two planes and their continued co-
occurrence causes the symbol to preserve its non-transparent character. 
That is what makes it different from a purely conventional sign. Ricœur 
is an important point of reference for Tischner; he is mentioned in many 
of his texts, e.g. Thinking from within the Metaphor.20
There is another aspect of this process, one perhaps less interesting 
from the hermeneutic perspective – which finds the world already 
described with the aid of symbols – but unusually vital from the 
phenomenological viewpoint. Underlying the symbol of guilt, which is 
in a sense a stain, is some kind of experience of one’s own sinfulness. 
Unconceptualised, unnamed, but calling for some kind of expression. 
A man experiences something, but at the same time feels that the reality 
he is coming into contact with defies encapsulation in simple words, or 
description with literal meanings. Therefore, the reality of evil does not 
require a concept, but a metaphor. At this stage one might say the world 
of human experience can be divided into two spheres: one capable of 
being described with concepts (a camel, a sheep, a tent, a well), and the 
one capable of being described with symbols. The latter one requires 
a symbolic expression, because it contains some mysteriousness, non-
transparency. Love is non-transparent, guilt is non-transparent, and all 
 19 Ps 51:4, New International Version, https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search= 
Psalm+51&version=NIV.
 20 See J. Tischner, Myślenie z wnętrza metafory, op. cit., p. 503.
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the sacred is non-transparent. To describe this sphere with concepts 
would mean to distort them.
In order to qualify this deliberation, it is worth introducing 
a distinction between the symbolised and the symbolising. As regards 
guilt as a stain, guilt is symbolised as a stain, and the stain is the 
symbolising with reference to the experience of guilt.
Such an understanding of a symbol21 clearly shows that it cannot 
be perceived as a “proto-concept.” Thus, a symbol cannot be easily 
demystified in line with the following principle: in days of yore people 
used to create symbols, because they were not able to think through the 
issues concerned with, say, evil, but today we can develop these symbols 
into concepts, clarifying that which originally was unclear.  A symbol will 
always remain murky and non-transparent,22 affecting our understanding 
in a completely different manner than a clear and lucid concept.
In particular situations the sphere of metaphoricity encompasses the 
whole world, putting question marks over all conceptual approaches. This 
can be seen in the use of metaphors in Plato’s cave. And again we can see 
another replication of Ricoeur’s pattern. There is a literal meaning of the 
cave, which is transferred onto a different plane: the world (or: the world 
of human experience) is like a cave – obscure, reflecting shadows, etc. 
The image is complemented by the other aspect of the metaphorisation 
process. The world we experience as the only one (and in this sense the 
ultimate one) is not the only one, nor ultimate; it is not what it seems 
to be in the sensual experience. What is it then? It is a shadow of the 
world, a reflection of the true world. If so, if the ostensibly unproblematic 
experience of the world reveals some kind of its non-obviousness, 
some mystery, then concepts need to be replaced with metaphors. 
Concepts would be mere distortions, because they would create the 
appearance of transparency and their self-sufficiency. But the symbol 
 21 For the purpose of the present study I use the concepts of “metaphor” and “symbol” inter-
changeably, just like Józef Tischner does in his texts. He was aware of the difference between the two, 
but - as he himself observed - Paul Ricœur equated them with each other. See J. Tischner, Myślenie 
z wnętrza metafory, op. cit., p. 503.
 22 See P. Ricoeur, Egzystencja i hermeneutyka, trans. S. Cichowicz i in., Warszawa 1985, p. 62n.
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with its non-transparency serves as a reference to “another world,” to 
the true reality. Therefore, metaphors arise out of the experience of the 
uncertainty and non-obviousness of the world. In this sense, they express 
some fundamental philosophical truth.
Another example of the totality of symbolical thinking can be 
furnished by primitive cultures, where every fact is an epiphany, where 
all reality – and not just some demarcated area of experience – becomes 
a manifestation of the sacred, and by extension is a symbol of something 
else. In a sense, such cases show a reversed direction of metaphorisation. 
An ordinary tree acquires a symbolic significance, because it is 
a manifestation of another world. We still say “tree,” but the reality that 
lies hidden underneath this word is far more complex and non-obvious 
than a natural fact: the structure of tissue and the processes that take place 
in it. At the same time, the tree does not cease to be a “flesh and blood” 
tree. A question then arises whether these two processes of symbolisation 
are of an identical character. In the first case, the non-literally understood 
word “stain” became a metaphorical expression for the experience of 
guilt, while in the second case, it is the tree itself that in some experience 
reveals its “depth,” becoming a symbol of “something more.” If we were 
to phenomenologically distinguish between these two cases, that is 
point to the phenomena found in experience, then in the first one we 
have an experience of guilt as a stain (the stain being something added), 
while in the second one we have an experience of a tree as an epiphany 
of the sacred. This genetic order is essential from the perspective of 
phenomenology, but in a ready-made symbol it becomes less essential for 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is presented with a symbol which is a living 
tension between literality and metaphoricity.
However, this order is of significance from the phenomenological 
perspective. What is the object of experience in the metaphorised world? 
Symbols or experiences which are then expressed in symbols? In the 
context Tischner’s philosophy it is a crucial matter.
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In the text Thinking from within the Metaphor Tischner mentions 
a few metaphors. He presents Plato’s cave,23 mentions Descartes’ 
malicious demon24 (this metaphor will be elaborated in Spór o istnienie 
człowieka25), but it is to the metaphor of giving birth that he assigns 
a special place.26 Tischner takes a closer look at the way it is used in 
the context of thinking about the Holy Trinity. At the literal level giving 
birth is a process of biological life. A new life is born, which involves 
a woman’s pain and suffering. In the context of the Holy Trinity this 
act of giving birth is subject to peculiar idealisation. God cannot suffer, 
and so giving birth becomes detached from any pain. And so we have 
a non-literal meaning of giving birth. We are left with a process that 
describes a relationship between the Father and the Son. Why can’t this 
be described non-metaphorically? The argument is quite obvious: the 
sphere of Divinity is inaccessible and non-transparent to us, and so any 
pronouncements on it with the aid of transparent concepts may result 
in distortions. An example of a transparent concept might be a cause-
effect relationship or a category of creation. But both these approaches 
underestimate consubstantiality. As an effect, the Son would be less 
perfect than the Father, while as a creation would be a reflection of God 
at best, something metaphysically different, as different as creation is 
different from the Creator. But then there is a metaphor. Until that point 
the symbolism of giving birth follows the above-described pattern.
But Tischner points to one more moment: the metaphor returns to 
earth. Processed for thinking about the Trinity, the metaphor of giving 
birth – now devoid of the moments of pain and suffering – proves useful 
when describing other spheres of reality, e.g. giving birth to the truth. 
Thus, metaphors move to and fro, between one world and the other; they 
return to earth, but when they do, they are changed.
 23 See J. Tischner, Myślenie z wnętrza metafory, op. cit., p. 491.
 24 See ibidem, p. 493.
 25 See J. Tischner, Spór o istnienie człowieka, op. cit., p. 19n.
 26 See idem, Myślenie z wnętrza metafory, op. cit., p. 498n.
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Where can the true life of metaphors be found then? Certainly not in 
the exchange of concepts for “soft concepts,” that is metaphors. Plato does 
not shift his whole story to the plane of the parable of the cave. He tries 
to elucidate it, his thoughts swinging between one world (mysterious 
communing with the truth of ideas) and the other (a blinded, chained-up 
prisoner leaving the cave). A metaphor is not an allegory which copies 
a problem under examination on a one-to-one basis. A metaphor is about 
a constant tension between literality and metaphoricity. A reduction of 
metaphor to just one element: a stain, a cave, giving birth would be in 
contradiction with this thinking. Thinking from within the metaphor 
is about constant leaving and returning. A reduction of metaphor to 
its non-literal pole only might be referred to as excessive poeticization, 
allegorization. Such a measure moves the metaphor away from thinking 
and philosophy. On the other hand, a reduction of metaphor to the 
other pole – replacing metaphors with accurate concepts – is referred 
to as “terrism.”27 That is an acknowledgement that the world of facts is 
obvious, self-explanatory and of an ultimate character. The symbol is not 
to be found on the same level as the allegory.
2. Three anthropological metaphors
The above analyses show Józef Tischner to be a theoretician of 
metaphor. However, unlike Ricoeur, he did not go about hunting 
metaphors in cultural texts. The paper Thinking from within the Metaphor 
is a manifesto. Tischner wants to think with the aid of metaphors, because 
he thinks that is the only way to touch the mystery of experience, the 
mystery of man. He does not care for accurate language any more, as 
he finds it to be a threat to philosophical investigations. A metaphor 
points to uncertainty, non-obviousness; with its tension between the 
literal and the metaphorical, a metaphor conveys the whole drama of 
the world.  If the problem of man lies at the very heart of Tischner’s 
philosophy, it is worth noting what metaphors he uses to describe man. 
 27 See idem, Myślenie religijne, op. cit., p. 377.
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Tischner-theoretician is followed by Tischner-practitioner of metaphor. 
To what extent does he remain faithful to his theoretical findings? How 
do metaphors live in his thinking?
From among the many metaphors Józef Tischner uses let us try and 
pick three. The choice is somewhat arbitrary, but at the same time it 
reveals tensions of metaphorical thinking.
A metaphor of song comes first in this set: “Man is like a song 
floating in time.”28 He is both the instrument and the artist. He himself 
sings that song, according to some sheet music, that is values. In this 
metaphor Tischner flatly rejects a substantialist view of man.29 The song 
is unfinished; it cannot be reduced to the sheet music. A true song is 
a song sung. The relation between the song and the sheet music is defined 
by man’s freedom.
Another metaphor is a definition of man as a dramatic being, which 
means: “to live in the present time, with other people around and the 
ground under one’s feet as a stage.”30 But also “to be a dramatic being 
means to believe – truly or falsely – that the doom or salvation is in man’s 
hands.”31 This metaphor serves as a foundation for the whole concept 
of the philosophy of drama, where such theatre symbols as the stage, 
a mask, drama are utilised to describe man in the entirety of his existence.
The third metaphor appears in the last period of Tischner’s work. It 
is a metaphor of man’s death. As he makes use of it, Tischner engages 
in a debate with Michel Foucault’s tradition: “man wants to prove that 
what he did [the evil of Auschwitz and Kolyma – D. K.] was not done by 
him, because he never was. Thus arises the idea of «the death of man».”32 
This metaphor has a special character: the argument about the death of 
man invalidates man; man’s condition is non-being.  Tischner realises 
the import and historical character of the experience concerned with 
 28 Idem, Etyka wartości i nadziei, [in:] D. von Hildebrand, J. A. Kłoczowski, J. Paściak, J. Tischner, 
Wobec wartości, Poznań 1982, p. 53.
 29 See idem, Filozofia człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów, op. cit., p. 233.
 30 Ibidem, Filozofia dramatu, op. cit., p. 7n.
 31 Ibidem, p. 10.
 32 J. Tischner, Spór o istnienie człowieka, op. cit., p. 57.
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the 20th-century totalitarianisms. But at the same time he advances the 
following proposition: “even if «man is dead» [...], this means that he 
existed, and if he did, then he can be reborn.”33 Man is dead, but people 
live. Thus, a living man finds man dead. This self-reference introduces 
a new element into the structure of Nietzsche’s phrase “God is dead.” 
There, man pronounced God dead; here, man pronounces himself dead. 
One might say that is only a metaphor - in the sense of an allegory, 
a simile with no strings attached. The death of man is an embarrassment 
to some model of humanity, some ideal man, and an end to the existing 
understanding. But the structure of this figurativeness is more complex: 
man can survive his own death. And then there is the statement: if man 
is dead, this means that he lived; therefore, he can be reborn. Who can be 
reborn? The same man or another one? If that man died, brought about 
his own self-destruction, then why would we have to resurrect him?
Each one of these metaphors requires in-depth analysis. But now let 
us focus on their shared structure. All along, the object of study has not 
been WHAT Tischner says about man, but HOW he does it. He speaks 
about man with the aid of metaphors. But do these metaphors resemble 
the ones he himself mentions in the Thinking from Within the Metaphor?
In Paul Ricœur’s writings unfamiliar experience (sin, guilt) becomes 
explicated with familiar concepts (a stain, losing the way). The symbolised 
is unclear and therefore needs the symbolising. The symbolising is 
borrowed from the everyday order: a stain, losing the way – these are 
common experiences understood by every man. They are supposed 
to become helpful in capturing that which is so difficult to express in 
concepts. Thus arises a metaphor. The case of the cave parable was alike. 
A student of Plato surely did not know what ideas were and how to get 
to know them – after all, the concept was an effect of Plato’s multi-year 
dialectical thinking and outstanding perspicacity. But the same student 
could easily imagine a chained-up man’s plight: the experience of the dark 
and the way it brightens up, the attendant experience of being blinded by 
 33 Ibidem, p. 8.
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excess light – these are everyday occurrences for every one of us. Plato 
uses the familiar as an introduction into the mysterious.
If Józef Tischner uses metaphors in his philosophy of man, he at 
least wants to tell us that man is mysterious, defies straightforward 
explanations, and that he cannot be reduced to the worldly only: 
reduction to factuality – terrism – distorts the truth about man. But apart 
from these similarities to the symbolical structures studied by Ricœur, 
Tischner suggests his own way which slightly diverges from such an 
understanding of metaphor. He performs metaphorisation of man, but 
at the same time the symbolising in Tischner is not derived from the 
everyday order. While man experiences songs, theatre and death in the 
world, and he can say something about them, it is hard to overlook the 
fact that these symbols are of a different character than a stain, losing the 
way, or a cave. Where does the difference lie?
Each one of the words mentioned by Tischner has some aspect of 
non-transparency about it. While man experiences songs: he listens 
to them and sometimes himself performs them, but at the same time 
there is something mysterious about music. While music is subject 
to mathematical harmonies,34 but at the same time it is some kind of 
unfathomable elemental force. As every field of art, it contains some 
unmeasurable, irrational element which defies simple analysis. The same 
goes for theatre. In a sense, it is describable: the stage, the audience, actors, 
dramas acted out, but at the same time that which is peculiar to theatre 
reaches the mysterious elemental forces.  Such were the ancient functions 
of theatre, such is the shape of the Polish dramatic tradition, after all so 
dear to Tischner: Dziady by Mickiewicz, Wesele by Wyspiański, the theatre 
of Grotowski, Kantor and Staniewski are about constant grappling with the 
mystery. Theatre appears to be even more mysterious than man himself. 
And last but not least, the death of man. When transferred to the problem 
of man, the paraphrase of Nietzsche’s famous statement “God is dead”35 
also tries to voice some unclear experience with a word the sense of which 
 34 See J. Tischner, Bezdroża spotkań, „Analecta Cracoviensia”, R. XII, 1980, p. 152.
 35 F. Nietzsche, Wiedza radosna, trans. L. Staff, Warszawa 1906, p. 108.
103 Man inside metaphors
is not that obvious after all. Death itself is a mystery to man, transcends all 
kinds of experience, is awe-inspiring and terrible. 
Thus, Tischner creates an all-new tension in his metaphors. The 
unfamiliar looks at itself in the mirror of the unfamiliar, the symbol 
remains inscrutable, which is quite unlike Ricœur’s analyses and his own 
theoretical studies of metaphor. There, a metaphor was shot out into the 
“heavens” and then it returned to earth. Here, the symbolising does not 
return to earth (if we understand “earth” as the familiar, everyday and 
clear). What then does Tischner want to tell us?
Might there be a mistake here? Is it conceivable that as Tischner was 
beguiled by his own symbolism, he failed to abide by the perception of 
metaphor he himself had earlier developed? Such conjecture is always 
risky. A mistake is rather out of the question, if one treats Tischner’s own 
words seriously. In the introduction to Filozofia dramatu he defines the 
purpose of his deliberations: “The primary aim is to restore the proper 
and peculiar gravity to the word drama.”36 Did Ricœur attempt to restore 
the proper and peculiar gravity to the word “stain”? No, his purpose was 
to examine the symbolism of evil. A stain was simple and straightforward; 
as regards its gravity, a stain is of no great import, inasmuch as it does 
not serve us in better understanding of the phenomenon of guilt. 
Therefore, the purpose of metaphorisation is not to raise the status of 
the symbolising, but to better understand the symbolised.
However, in Tischner there is some confusion in this respect. It 
might seem that the purpose of the philosophy of drama project is to 
show some truth about man, some important truth expressed in the 
metaphor of a dramatic being. However, something else transpires: it 
is about a better understanding of the concept of drama. A purpose 
thus redefined might suggest that Tischner’s main goal is a peculiar 
philosophy of theatre. If  man appears in it, he will only be there as 
a means to restore the “gravity.” But Tischner is not interested in theatre 
as a goal, which is corroborated by almost all analyses of the book quoted 
here. He is not even interested in drama as such, unless it can be used as 
 36 J. Tischner, Filozofia dramatu, op. cit., p. 7.
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a handy metaphor to explain the problems of human destiny. One might 
even hazard a hypothesis whereby Tischner wrote the introduction to 
Filozofia dramatu with completely different discussion in view. By way 
of illustration, he wrote that time is the substance of drama.37 Substance, 
that is something tremendously important - just like in the metaphor of 
song time is “an internal reality of the melody,”38 essential for the existence 
of the song. But there are not many analyses of time and temporality to 
be found in the body of Filozofia dramatu. Tischner also writes about the 
stage,39 but he is quick to drop this element of metaphor. Apart from the 
introduction, he does not really care for the stage.
Therefore, it is neither man, nor drama. How to get out of this pitfall? 
Tischner’s method is different. Apparently, it is no accident that the three 
major metaphors use words that themselves require explication. Many 
years intervene between these metaphors: for the first time the “song” 
appears in the mid-1970s; the metaphor of “drama” appears at the end of 
the same decade40 and finds its culmination in Filozofia dramatu (first 
edition – 1990); the analyses of “the death of man” emerge in the mid-
1990s. Thus, there are two decades of consistent – and different from the 
posited theory – “practice of metaphorisation” developed by Tischner.
Since it is not a matter of accident – replication of the same 
measure over the years points to some consistency – then it is fitting 
that a question is posed about the method. What is metaphor for 
Tischner?  The symbolising and the symbolised remain in a constant 
state of tension. Man is a mystery, and drama (song, death) is mysterious. 
Metaphors are constructed to enable understanding of man. It is not 
merely a hermeneutic measure in Tischner’s writings. He sees man as 
a dramatic being, he experiences human existence as drama. In this 
respect he is extremely close to the thinking of Ricœur himself. As he 
distinguishes the symbol from the allegory, Ricœur writes that allegory 
 37 See ibidem, p. 8.
 38 J. Tischner, Filozofia człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów, op. cit., p. 233.
 39 See idem, Filozofia dramatu, op. cit., p. 8n.
 40 It is difficult to point to one single moment, but a major step in this field was certainly Tischner’s 
paper Fenomenologia spotkania, published in the journal “Analecta Cracoviensia,” R. X, 1978.
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is always a kind of hermeneutic, but a symbol is not; a symbol remains 
on a different plane, preceding hermeneutics.41 If for Tischner drama 
is a metaphor thus construed, then it is in a sense experienced, and not 
chosen as a handy tool. If it were a mere tool, it could be replaced with 
another tool. However, if drama and the dramaticism are phenomena 
of human experience, then their presence is no accident. That is why 
Tischner posits, as one of the objectives of his analyses, the restoration 
of the gravity to the concept of drama. It is not that neither drama nor 
man is the purpose of the project. Both man and drama are the purpose – 
simultaneously. If we restore the proper and peculiar gravity to the word 
drama, we will be in a better position to reveal the truth about man. Man 
explicated by “any sloppy” drama will remain unknown.
Tischner discerned the complexity and mysteriousness of the subject 
he explored all his life. That might arguably serve as explanation for the 
turns in his thinking: it is all the time about the elucidation of man, but 
a proper language needs to be found. Prior to the periods of Tischner’s 
philosophy of man that I mentioned before, there was one more: of the 
language of Thomism learnt at seminary. Tischner was quite quick to see 
its uselessness in the description of human experience.42 Therefore, his 
further investigations are concerned with an attempt to find a language to 
express man: both his exteriority and hidden depths, both his simplicity 
and mysteriousness.
For this purpose Tischner needs his “dark metaphors.” He does not 
translate the issues concerned with man into an allegorical language of 
a different conceptual framework, even though it might seem to be the 
case: the world is a stage; relationships with people are dramas, etc. He 
combines two “dark” concepts in one grip. A metaphor does not soar 
up to the sky only to return disburdened, which is where Tischner 
discerns a threat to metaphorisation.43 That is what he perhaps fears, 
 41 See P. Ricoeur, Symbolika zła, op. cit., p. 19n.
 42 See Spotkanie. Z ks. Józefem Tischnerem rozmawia Anna Karoń-Ostrowska, Kraków 2003, 
pp. 41, 55n.
 43 See J. Tischner, Myślenie z wnętrza metafory, op. cit., p. 502.
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only rarely tapping the arsenal of colloquial terms, e.g. “a stain.” That 
grip of metaphor goes even deeper: song, drama, death (if we treat it 
ontologically, and not ontically) are inconceivable themselves without 
man. But a stain and a cave are not. Hence, those Tischnerian metaphors 
are integrated into man not at Tischner’s behest, but by nature. As a result, 
one of the purposes of the philosophy of drama – viewed even as an 
intellectual tool to elucidate some phenomena of human destiny – must 
also be work centred around drama, because without it the elucidation 
will not be successful.
3. The Logos of Metaphor
The purpose of this short study is not to show WHAT Józef Tischner 
wrote about man, but rather HOW he formulated that. The linguistic 
array proves to be not only a tool, but also a method resulting from 
metaphysical convictions. Thinking from within the metaphor arises 
out of the conviction that “a metaphor, a symbol are no accidental 
phenomena in radical thinking, but they are simply manifestations of its 
radicalism.”44 At the same time, this radicalism acts as an agreement not to 
have thinking prevailed over by the desire for oversimplified elucidation, 
clarification and disambiguation. There are places in thinking that can 
be thought only “from within the metaphor.” Therefore, a metaphor 
is not some kind of linguistic expression external to thinking, but it is 
something that underlies thinking.
Noteworthily, there is some internal logos, some extraordinarily 
accurate structure that can be encapsulated in metaphors. A particular 
logos is contained within the metaphors used by Tischner, who thinks 
about man from within such ambiguous and mysterious concepts 
as “drama,” “song” and “death.” In his philosophising these concepts 
become combined with the concepts of man by way of a very strong and 
not entirely penetrable relation: in order to describe man, one needs to 
make use of the metaphor of drama, but in order to do that, one needs 
 44 Ibidem, p. 504.
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to restore the proper gravity to the concept of “drama.” How can this be 
done? Tischner shows that throughout Filozofia dramatu: he describes 
man from within dramatic figurativeness, highlighting a variety of 
pivotal points in his life: the drama of temptation, the drama of the 
truth, the drama of beauty. Couching these phenomena in new symbols 
reveals their internal tensions and connections which might not have 
been visible before. At the same time, each one of these analyses restores 
the proper gravity to drama. Thus, both the polar opposites of metaphor 
are essential to one another. Subjugating either one to the other – which 
might be suggested by the distinction between the symbolised and the 
symbolising – is not as easy as in the case of metaphors, which make use 
of the everyday order. The polar opposites of Tischner’s metaphors live 
off each other, becoming more firmly combined at every turn of thinking.
The three metaphors which Tischner used in different periods of his 
philosophising about man have been mentioned above. Each one could 
be analysed in depth in order to capture the innermost structures in this 
“logos of metaphor.” One might also point to many other metaphors: a face, 
a home, a hideout, etc., which populate the Tischnerian universum of 
symbols. All this, however, is a task exceeding the compass of the present 
study. What remains then? A strong conviction that Tischner is yet to be 
discovered, that we need a new attempt at comprehensive interpretation 
of his philosophy of man, which will arise from the thoroughly thought-
through logic (or better: dialectic) of the Tischnerian metaphors. This 
attempt is yet to be made.
Abstract
The subject of the article is a role of metaphor in Józef Tischner’s philosophy. In late 
seventies he shaped an idea of „thinking within metaphor”, which was an essential mod-
ification of phenomenological method Tischner used before. Metaphorizing is not only 
an unliterally language expression, but also the metaphysical statement, that the world an 
human experience cannot be described in strict concepts. Metaphors and symbols have 
their own logic and hermeneutics, which shows their inner tensions. I proposed a new 
approach to Tischner philosophy, which allows unveil this „life of metaphor”.
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